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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Although there is no Court of Appeals decision construing this
issue, lower court decisions appear to be in accord with the instant
case.
3 1
The facts of the case show an injury without the state which,
however, resulted in consequential damages within the state through
loss of earnings, hospital expenses and .the like. In Feathers both
the original injury and the consequential damages occurred within
New York. Since the Conference intended to overrule the result
reached in Feathers,2 it is doubtful that the amendment was meant
to go beyond the facts of that case. In any event, keeping in
mind the narrow approach taken by the Court of Appeals, it is
unlikely that a more far-reaching effect would be recognized.
This conclusion is strengthened by the decision in Platt Corp.
v. Platt,3 where jurisdiction over the defendant was predicated on
CPLR 302(a)(2). Defendant was a director of plaintiff cor-
poration and did not attend meetings or perform any duties in
New York. While the decision was predicated on the absence of
a "tortious act within the state" under 302(a)(2), the Court did
mention that even under the then proposed amendment to Section
302 (302(a)(3)), there would be no jurisdictional predicate. It
would appear then that under 302(a)(3), the Court of Appeals
will require some physical contact with the state and this means
that the original injury must occur within the state itself. More-
over, realizing that every accident results in consequential damages
in the plaintiff's home state, a holding to the contrary would most
probably encounter serious due process questions.
CPLR 308(4): Insurer who disclaims liability is
without standing to object to substituted service.
CPLR 308(4) authorizes a court, upon ex parte motion, to
provide for substituted service where service is "impracticable,"
under CPLR 308(1), (2) and (3). A method thus devised by
a court is subject to the due process requirement that service be
reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of the pending
suit and an opportunity to be heard.34
In Atomic Development & Machine, Corp. v. De Stefano,35
defendant's (insurance carrier "unequivocally" disclaimed liability
31E.g., Rose v. Sans Souci Hotel, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1099, 274 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
32hudicial Conference Report on the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 2
McKINNLY's SESsOiN LAWs 2780, 2786-90 (1966).
33 17 N.Y.2d 234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).34 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), rehearing denied, 312
U.S. 712 (1941).
35 55 Misc. 2d 210, 284 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1967).
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before commencement of any judicial proceedings. The civil court
issued an ex parte order providing for substituted service on the
defendant under CPLR 308(4), which included mailing of process
to the defendant's insurance company.
The insurance company's motion to vacate and set aside the
summons and complaint was denied. Because the movant dis-
claimed liability and declined to appear generally on behalf of
defendant or itself, it was considered to be without standing to
object to service.
The decision must be questioned in light of past cases. In
Winterstein v. Pollard,-6 plaintiffs requested an order from the
court directing them to serve process on the defendant by serving
her insurance carrier. The facts showed that the defendant, a New
York resident, had given her proper address to a policeman at the
scene of the accident. She subsequently moved and mail addressed
to her was returned. She was not listed in any current telephone
books and the Department of Motor Vehicles had no other address
for her. In denying the application, the court found that there
had been insufficient showing that service was "impracticable" under
CPLR 308(1), (2) and (3). The court felt that certain avenues
under section 308 had not been utilized.37 In any event the court
felt that "[w]ithout some showing of the actual relationship be-
tween insurer and insured . . . it [could not] be said that notice
to the insurer [was] reasonably calculated to give notice to the
defendant." 38
In Brodsky v. Spencer,39 an order issued by the court under
CPLR 308(4), directing that service be made on defendant by
mailing the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State and
to defendant's insurance company was held inappropriate. The facts
showed that defendant's address was a demolished building and his
whereabouts unknown even to his insurance carrier. The court
noted that since the insurance company did not know where the
defendant was, service upon it was not "reasonably calculated to
give notice to the defendant." 40
There appears to be no valid distinction where the insurance
company is ignorant of defendant's whereabouts and when the
carrier disclaims liability. In either case it should be allowed to
36 50 Misc. 2d 354, 270 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
3 7 See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 912, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99 (1966); Fishman v. Sanders, 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861(2d Dep't 1962) (mem.) (both allowing attachment of the insurance carrier's
obligations under the policy); Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206
N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965) (allowing attachment of wages and
publication); See also CPLR 3102(c) which provides for disclosure in aid
of bringing an action.
38 50 Misc. 2d at 355, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
30 53 Misc. 2d 4, 277 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
40 d. at 6, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
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question the propriety of service authorized by a court under
308(4). In the latter case the interests of the defendant and his
carrier conflict and denial to question the propriety of service under
308(4) may substantially affect the carrier's rights adversely.
CPLR 321: Insurance counsel not permitted to effectuate
a disclaimer by withdrawal.
In Bialyr v. Reeber,41 the court denied a motion to withdraw
made by defendant's counsel. The attorney had been retained by
defendant's insurance company to defend him. Prior to this motion
the insurance company had attempted to disclaim for lack of co-
operation on defendant's part because he gave two conflicting ver-
sions of the accident. 42 Nevertheless the carrier was then held to
be under a duty to defend. An exhaustive and diligent search hav-
ing been made in an effort to locate the defendant, counsel pre-
dicated his motion to withdraw on the necessity of presence of
the defendant at the trial.
The court conceded that the insurer might have grounds for
a valid disclaimer but was unwilling to allow defendant's attorney
tp withdraw and thus use this as a "device to obtain or ratify a
disclaimer-in-fact." 43 Generally, the courts require a plenary action
for a declaratory judgment as to the insurance carrier's coverage
liability.4.
An attorney "may terminate his relationship at any time for
a good and sufficient cause and upon reasonable notice." -s A good
cause is found where it appears that -the defendant and his insur-
ance company are at odds, i.e., where the insurance company dis-
claims liability under the policy. To require the attorney in such
a case to represent the defendant would create a genuine conflict
of interest. However, since the courts place a heavy burden of
proof upon the insurer before liability may be disclaimed, 4 they
will not permit counsel by way of withdrawal to effectuate a dis-
claimer. For, while, in reality, the attorney represents the insurer,
his position is such that until there is a disclaimer, he has certain
obligations to the insured.4 7
4154 Misc. 2d 773, 283 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1967).
42 "On the trial of the disclaimer action [defendant] gave several other
versions and was characterized then . . . as an incredible witness-absolutely
unworthy of belief." Id. at 774, 283 N.Y.S2d at 452.
431d. at 775, 283 N.Y.S2d at 452.
4 Ganas v. Terry, 16 App. Div.' 2d 826, 228 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't
1962) (mem.); Brooks v. City of New York, 1 Misc. 2d 740, 149 N.Y.S.2d
592 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956).
45 I re Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 403, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (1912).
46 Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d
503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967); Amatucci v. Maryland Cas. Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 583, 267 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1966) (Per curiam).
4a Bialy v. Reeber, 54 Misc. 2d 773, 775, 283 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Sup.
Ct Suffolk County 1967).
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